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FIT TO PRINT? CONSEQUENCES OF
IMPLEMENTING A FEDERAL
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
In July 2003, a then-unidentified source revealed the name of a
covert CIA operative to as many as six Washington, D.C., journalists.
Later, syndicated columnist Robert Novak published the identity of
the operative, Valerie Plame. 1 The White House and the Department
of Justice appointed United States Attorney for the Northern District
of Illinois Patrick Fitzgerald as special prosecutor to oversee a
criminal investigation to ferret out and hold accountable the source
who revealed Plame's identity.2 Hoping to secure an indictment after
an extensive investigation,3 Fitzgerald convened a federal grand jury.
Fitzgerald subpoenaed New York Times reporter Judith Miller and
Time magazine correspondent Matthew Cooper, two of the reporters
to whom Plame's identity was revealed, and asked them to disclose
the name of their source. Both refused and were subsequently held in
civil contempt.5 Although Cooper ultimately testified before the grand
jury, Miller continued her silence. On July 7, 2005, she was jailed.6
The Times called her imprisonment "a proud but awful moment" for
the publication, declaring that it would stand by her as she
"surrender[ed] her liberty in defense of a greater liberty.",7 Miller
spent eighty-five days in jail before her confidential source released
her from her journalistic obligation of confidentiality. 8 Later, the
I Robert D. Novak, Mission to Niger, WASH. POST, July 14,2003, at A21.
2 Eric Lichtblau, Special Counsel is Named to Head Inquiry on Leak, N.Y TIMES, Dec.
31, 2003, at Al.
3 The intentional or knowing disclosure of the identity of undercover intelligence agents
is a federal crime, punishable by imprisonment often years. 50 U.S.C. § 421 (2006).
4 Adam Liptak, Times Reporter is Subpoenaed in Leak Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004,
at AI4.
5 Adam Liptak, A Reporter Jailed: Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2005, at Al.
6 Id.
7 Editorial, Judith Miller Goes to Jail, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A22.
s David Johnston & Douglas Jehl, Times Reporter Free From Jail; She Will Testify, N.Y.
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sources were discovered to be Vice-President Dick Cheney's former
Chief of Staff I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, ex-presidential advisor Karl
Rove, and then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.9
Miller's imprisonment is neither novel nor unique. Since the
Supreme Court first declined to extend a federal privilege to reporters
in 1972,10 more than twenty journalists have been imprisoned in the
United States." For example, Florida newspaper reporter Timothy
Roche was jailed for eighteen days in 1990 after refusing to identify
who leaked a sealed court order. 12 New York Times reporter Myron
Farber served forty days in jail in 1978 when he refused to reveal
sources in a criminal trial.13 Internet blogger Joshua Wolf was
imprisoned after refusing to turn over videotapes of a protest to police
for use in an investigation.14 He was briefly freed pending appeal, but
returned to jail when the Ninth Circuit refused to reconsider his
appeal en banc.'5 Until recently, freelance investigative author
Vanessa Leggett held the record, serving 168 days in prison after
refusing to disclose confidential source information to a Texas grand
jury. 16 Leggett was freed after the grand jury's term expired, never
breaching her promise of confidentiality.' 7 Leggett's record was
bested only by internet blogger Joshua Wolf, who served 226 days in
a federal prison for contempt after he refused to comply with a federal
grand jury subpoena and turn over videotapes of activists clashing
with San Francisco police. 8 Government-mandated disclosure of
confidential journalistic information continues to make news
headlines-evidence that the issue of a reporter's privilege is far from
being resolved. 19
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at Al.
9 Id; see also David Johnston, Novak Told Prosecutor His Sources in Leak Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 2006, at A16; David Johnston, Ex-U.S. Official Called Likely Leak Source, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at A24.
10 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (refusing to find a reporter's privilege on
First Amendment or federal common law grounds).
I Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Paying the Price: A Recent Census of
Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify, http://www.rcfp.org/jail.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2008) [hereinafter Paying the Price].
12 In re Roche, 448 U.S. 1312 (1980).
13 In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978).
14 Paying the Price, supra note 11.
Is Wolf v. United States, 201 F. App'x. 430 (9th Cir. 2006), reh 'g en banc denied.
16 Paying the Price, supra note 11.
1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Vanessa Leggett, No 01-20745 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001);
see also Alan Bernstein & Rosanna Ruiz, Leggett Free - For Now, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 5,
2002, at Al.
18 Joe Mozingo, Imprisoned Blogger is Freed in Deal with Federal Prosecutor, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, at Cal. Metro 3.
19 See Dan Eggen, Grand Jury Subpoenas Times Reporter Over Book Sources, WASH.
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Those imprisoned each asserted a testimonial privilege against
disclosing the identity of confidential sources or other journalistic
information. They attempted to employ a reporter's privilege to shield
themselves from criminal or civil liability, while maintaining their
ethical and journalistic obligations of source confidentiality. This
Note examines the evolution of this reporter's privilege at the federal
level. It traces both the traditional approach in the federal courts as
well as the more recent judicial developments. It also draws
comparisons to both legislatively-enacted statutory shield laws and
judicially-crafted common law privileges. This background serves
primarily as a foundation for analyzing two primary questions: to
whom should such a privilege apply, and what are the consequences
, • .. 20
of implementing a reporter's privilege.
This Note is divided into three primary sections. Part I traces the
evolution of a reporter's privilege at both the federal and state levels.
Part II discusses the federal privilege, to the extent it exists, with
respect to various holders of the privilege. Part II addresses the
various scenarios in which the mainstream media commonly invokes
the privilege-i.e., grand jury proceedings, criminal matters, civil
actions, and legislative inquiries. Drawing heavily on state statutory
models, Part II also discusses how nontraditional media entities fit
into the schematic of a federal privilege, before moving even further
beyond this boundary, in questioning whether non-media parties
could ever invoke the federal privilege. Finally, Part III addresses the
potential consequences of implementing a federal reporter's privilege,
most notably the licensure of journalists.
I. EVOLUTION OF A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
2 1
At its most fundamental level, a reporter's privilege is a
testimonial privilege, which journalists hold, conferring the right to
refuse to disclose the confidential source of information used
POST, Feb. 2, 2008, at A7 (discussing the grand jury subpoena of New York Times reporter
James Risen, who relied on confidential sources in a book discussing unsuccessful CIA efforts
to destabilize the Iranian nuclear program.)
20 This Note does not revisit the existing debate as to whether a privilege should exist. It
also omits other substantive elements of developing a reporter's privilege at the federal level
(i.e., balancing interests, exceptions, waiver, and other elements). Although the analysis touches
on specific aspects of a reporter's privilege, it is not meant to create a model federal privilege.
That is a task too broad in scope and too great in depth for the purposes of this Note.
21 This analysis and discussion is grounded in constitutional theory as it applies to both
federal and state judicial decision-making and legislation. For practical guidance in litigating
cases involving a reporter's privilege, see Kelli L. Sager & Rochelle L. Wilcox, Protecting
Confidential Sources, 33 LITIG. 36 (2007).
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throughout the newsgathering process. However, this is a generic
description; the true breadth and depth of the privilege are as varied
as the privileges are numerous.22 The development of a reporter's
privilege in the United States has a somewhat disjointed history. The
notion that a journalist is not required to disclose the source of
information is not found among the testimonial privileges historically
recognized at common law. Instead, the genesis of a reporter's
privilege is two-fold, developing both at the state and federal levels,
depending on who seeks to compel disclosure of the journalist's
confidential information. This section first examines the primary
constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege-the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution-and the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes.2 3 Next, this
section analyzes significant post-Branzburg federal appellate-court
decisions. Finally, it contrasts the common law source of the federal
privilege with the statutory source of various state privileges.
A. The Constitutional Basis and Branzburg
The constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege is rooted
primarily in the First Amendment of the federal Constitution. The
Amendment expressly provides for freedom of the press: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.'2 4 Proponents of the privilege contend that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment further solidifies
the constitutional basis for a reporter's privilege by making the First
Amendment applicable to the states. The Supreme Court agrees,
having held that First Amendment rights are incorporated to the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.25 The "freedom of the press"
provided for in the First Amendment encompasses a group of rights.
For instance, in certain circumstances, the First Amendment protects
journalists from prior restraints.2 6 The First Amendment also provides
22 Statutory shield laws and common law privileges vary significantly in scope, especially
with regard to whom the privilege protects, what type of information is and is not subject to
compelled disclosure, and in what legal contexts the privilege applies. See discussion, infra.
23 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
24 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
25 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (holding that "freedom of speech and of
the press . . .are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected . .. from
impairment by the States").
26 A prior restraint is the suppression of speech prior to its publication or dissemination.
The Supreme Court states with particular clarity that such restraints on speech bear a heavy
presumption against constitutional validity. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403
U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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special protection for journalists publishing statements about public
officials.27 Thus, although the freedoms are not absolute, the First
Amendment provides significant constitutional protections to
journalists.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the question of a
reporter's privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes in 1972.28 The case was a
series of consolidated actions involving reporters who had promised
confidentiality to news sources. Branzburg published articles in the
Louisville Courier-Journal regarding marijuana production,
distribution, and use. Branzburg was summoned before a grand jury
and was asked to disclose the sources for his stories. Pappas was a
television photographer who gained access to and filmed activity
inside Black Panther headquarters in Massachusetts. The footage was
never used or published, but Pappas was nevertheless summoned
before a grand jury to reveal what, if any, criminal activity he had
witnessed. Both reporters refused to disclose the requested
information. The central constitutional question in Branzburg was
"whether requiring [journalists] to appear and testify before state or
federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment., 29 Writing for the Court, Justice
White opined that journalists had the same obligations as ordinary
citizens and that "neither the First Amendment nor any other
constitutional provision protects the average citizen from disclosing
to a grand jury information that he has received in confidence. 30
In reaching this conclusion, Justice White also employed
traditional constitutional balancing. He wrote that the significant
truth-finding function of the grand jury constitutes a government
interest sufficient to overcome the First Amendment interests of
reporters.31 The journalists and their amici urged the Court that
refusing to acknowledge a reporter's privilege would "undermine the
freedom of the press to collect and disseminate news. 32 In response,
Justice White noted that existing constitutional protections have
sufficiently provided for the free operation of journalism. Yet Justice
27 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
28 408 U.S. 665.
29 Id. at 667. Justice White's plurality opinion also addressed the question of whether the
First Amendment conferred on journalists an absolute right to gather news. Justice White
answered this question in the negative, noting that "the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally." Id. at 684. Although related, this aspect of Branzburg is collateral to an analysis of
the reporter's privilege. It is not discussed here.
30 Id. at 682.
31 Id. at 687-90.
32 Id. at 698.
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White did not foreclose a reporter's privilege entirely; journalists
were not required to answer to "oppressive, unnecessary, irrelevant,
and other improper" grand jury inquiries.33 This, however, did not
amount to a reporter's privilege, insofar as ordinary citizens also
enjoyed constitutional protection from such inappropriate
proceedings. Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist, joined Justice White's plurality opinion.
Four justices dissented. Justice Stewart, with whom Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined, argued that the First Amendment's
freedom of the press necessarily includes a right to gather news.
Justice Stewart noted that "[t]he right to gather news implies, in turn,
a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his
source." 34 The Stewart dissent created a three-part test to determine
whether a journalist would be required to disclose the identity of
confidential sources. The government would have to demonstrate
that: (1) a journalist possesses relevant information; (2) the
information is unobtainable by alternative means; and (3) the need for
the information is compelling. 35 Justice Douglas dissented separately
to advocate an absolute reporter's privilege.36
Justice Powell represented the critical swing vote in Branzburg.
Justice Powell's brief, albeit powerful, concurring opinion is arguably
the logical springboard for any discussion of a federal reporter's
privilege. 37 Justice Powell did not believe "that [journalists],
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are without constitutional
rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their
sources." 38 Justice Powell's concurrence is often read as providing a
qualified reporter's privilege, allowing journalists to refuse to disclose
the confidential source of information under particular circumstances.
He partially echoed Justice White's plurality opinion but added one
significant qualification:
If a [journalist] believes that the grand jury investigation is
not being conducted in good faith he is not without remedy.
Indeed, if the [journalist] is called upon to give information
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject
33 Id. at 675.
34 Id. at 728 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37 Had Justice Powell dissented, the Branzburg holding would undoubtedly be read
oppositely. A reporter's privilege would surely exist; the debate would instead center on
whether the privilege is Justice Powell's qualified privilege or Justice Douglas's absolute
privilege.
38 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
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of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe
that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have
access to the court ....
Justice Powell also utilized traditional constitutional balancing. He
required any privilege to "strik[e] a proper balance between freedom
of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony" as well as the constitutional and societal interests of
maintaining established and necessary judicial proceedings.4n
"[W]here legitimate First Amendment interests require protection,"
Justice Powell assured the media that courts would provide
appropriate remedies.4 '
B. The Branzburg Progeny
Justice Powell's qualification that journalists may assert a
testimonial privilege provided the foundation for an extensive series
of later cases exploring, adopting, and applying a federal reporter's
privilege. Indeed, while Justice Powell's concurrence had the legal
effect of providing the fifth vote for the judgment against the
reporters, it continues to have the practical effect of leaving the door
open to a qualified reporter's privilege.42 The Supreme Court has
scarcely revisited Branzburg. In the nearly thirty-five years since
Branzburg, only fifty-five Supreme Court decisions cite that case.4 3
Many of these decisions relate to the corollary issue in Branzburg-
the absolute right to newsgathering under the First Amendment,
subject to laws of general applicability-albeit in other contexts. 44
Because Branzburg is seemingly limited to the invoking of a
39 Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Justice Stewart's dissent characterized Justice Powell's concurrence as an "enigmatic
[view, giving] some hope of a more flexible view in the future." Id. at 725 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
43 Compare the Supreme Court's reluctance to revisit Branzburg with its insistence on
revisiting the right to abortion announced in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The same nine
justices decided Roe only seven months after their decision in Branzburg. Since that time, the
Supreme Court cites Roe in 122 subsequent opinions, more than double the subsequent citations
to Branzburg. Similarly, federal appellate courts cite Roe 729 times, compared to only 339
federal appellate decisions citing Branzburg.
44 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (civil action for breach of
reporter's promise for confidentiality); Press-Enterp. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1 (1986)
(mandamus action to compel government disclosure of records); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (civil action for defamation).
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reporter's privilege in grand jury proceedings, a handful of decisions
examine the issue in other contexts.45
While in every Branzburg-related case that has reached the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Court has declined to adopt any version of a
reporter's privilege,46 the situation is significantly different in federal
appellate courts. Given that the Branzburg Court did not define a
clear majority with respect to the privilege, judges in circuit courts are
free to formulate their own approach. This makes many circuits seem
more open to recognizing a qualified reporter's privilege. For
example, the Third Circuit has an exceptionally strong reporter's
privilege in all proceedings.47 Other circuits have recognized a
qualified privilege but have fashioned unique balancing tests, which
must be satisfied before a journalist invokes the privilege.48 A few
circuits extremely limit their recognition of a federal reporter's
privilege or refuse to recognize the privilege altogether. The Seventh
Circuit rejects the privilege completely,49 whereas recent cases in the
Sixth Circuit, which had also routinely rejected the privilege, now
suggest recognition of a qualified privilege in limited circumstances.50
C. State Shield Laws: A Statutory Privilege
It is important to note that Branzburg and its progeny are
controlling only with respect to a federal reporter's privilege. Because
of the U.S. Supreme Court's unwillingness to recognize a federal
reporter's privilege,5 and Congress's reluctance to codify the
45 See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990) (rejecting the privilege for
academic employment records); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (rejecting the privilege
in civil discovery); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563-67 (1978) (rejecting the
privilege as a challenge to a search warrant).
46 See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301 (1978) (reaffirming that the
First Amendment does not provide a constitutional privilege to journalists). But see In re Roche,
448 U.S. 1312 (1980) (recognizing that, because of the divergence of views in Branzburg, the
question of a reporter's privilege has not been foreclosed).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the
privilege applies in criminal cases); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979)
(holding that the privilege applies in civil actions).
48 See, e.g., LaRouche v. NBC, 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (adopting Justice
Powell's Branzburg concurrence); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1983)
(reaffirming three-part balancing test for disclosure of confidential journalist sources); Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977) (adopting a similar four-part balancing
test).
49 See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the
Seventh Circuit does not recognize the reporter's privilege).
5o Compare Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Stone (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 810 F.2d 580
(6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the privilege in favor of the Branzburg majority's balancing factors),
with Ventura v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 396 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2005) (recognizing the privilege
under substantive state law).
51 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see also supra note 43.
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privilege,52 many states have independently recognized a reporter's
privilege. Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia have
codified the reporter's privilege through legislative action.53 Some
states without a legislatively enacted shield law have recognized a
reporter's privilege through the courts.54 Many state courts adopt the
limited reasoning of Branzburg and its progeny or the approach that
the federal appellate circuits in which the state is located has
employed.55  Only six states-Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, and Vermont-have declined to recognize
either a statutory or judicial privilege.56 Wyoming also has no
52 Congress has made numerous failed attempts at codifying a federal statutory privilege.
The most recent attempt, the federal Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, creates a qualified
reporters' privilege. The bill is designed "[t]o maintain the free flow of information to the public
by providing conditions for the federally compelled disclosure of information by certain persons
connected with the news media." Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 110th Cong
(2007); Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, S. 2035, 1 10th Cong. (2007). The House of
Representatives overwhelmingly passed its version of the bill, by a recorded vote of 398 to 21.
See 153 CONG. REC. H11,587, 11,602-03 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007). The Senate has yet to act on
either the House bill or its own version, which contains terrorism, national security and
additional exceptions, having stalled on the Senate floor despite the favorable reports of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. See 153 CONG. REc. D1,326 (2007); 154 CONG. REC. S7,710-21,
7,759 (daily ed. July 30, 2008) (showing the last failed attempt by the Senate to close debate on
S. 2035).
53 The states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005); Alaska, ALASKA
STAT. §§ 9.25.300-.390 (2006); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (2003); Arkansas,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005); California, CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1995);
Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2007); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320-
26 (1999); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-
30 (1995); Illinois, 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901-8-909 (West 2003); Indiana, IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 34-46-4-1, -2 (West 1999); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (West 2006);
Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1454 (1999); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-112 (LexisNexis 2006); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 767A.6(6) (West
2000); Minnesota, MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 595.021-025 (West 2000); Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-1-901-1-903 (2007); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144-20-147 (1997);
Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §49.275 (LexisNexis 2006); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:84A-21 (West 1994); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. § 38-6-7 (2003); New York, N.Y. CIV.
RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1992); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11 (2007);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1996); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04,
.11, .12 (West 2006); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1993); Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 44.510-540 (2007); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942 (West
2000); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-19.1-1-9-19.1-3 (1997); South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-100 (Supp. 2006); and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2000).
54 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (recognizing a limited
privilege from disclosure under state constitution); Dallas Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Mouer, 533 S.W.2d
70, 75-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (recognizing a balancing test for the privilege); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 1974) (recognizing a privilege that must be balanced
against fair trial concems).
55 See, e.g., In re Contempt of Wright, 700 P.2d 40 (Idaho 1985) (recognizing a qualified
privilege under Branzburg and the federal appellate courts); Opinion of the Justices, 373 A.2d at
646-47 (utilizing Branzburg to find a qualified privilege under the state constitution).
56 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Liberty Newspapers Ltd. Partnership, 971 P.2d 1089 (Haw. 1999);
In re Letellier, 578 A.2d 722 (Maine 1990); In re Roche, 411 N.E.2d 466 (Mass. 1980); CBS,
Inc. v. Cambpell, 645 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (citing Exparte Holliway, 199 S.W. 412
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statutory privilege, and the state courts have never addressed the
question.57
The states with a statutory privilege, commonly referred to as a
reporter's shield law, have enacted protections diverse in both scope
and applicability. Some states have detailed shield laws, while others
adopt a general version of the reporter's privilege.58 Many state shield
laws protect only traditional media entities-newspapers, radio
broadcasters, and television stations.59 Other states allow others to
exercise the privilege as well.6° Most states apply their privilege in all
legal contexts, while a few limit exercise of the privilege to certain
proceedings.6' A few states incorporate the balancing tests similar to
those adopted in the federal courts.62
Although this Note is primarily concerned with the application of a
federal reporter's privilege, the state shield laws cannot be ignored.
First, many recent federal appellate decisions incorporate the
parameters of state shield laws in fashioning the federal privilege.
63
Second, the shield laws are part of substantive state law. As such,
64they may govern a question of privilege in a federal diversity action.
Finally, near unanimity among the states may possibly be the only
thing that persuades the United States Supreme Court to revisit the
reasoning in Branzburg and genuinely establish a federal reporter's
privilege.65 This Note evaluates the application of a federal privilege
to nontraditional entities based on state statutory privileges in Part
II.B.
(Mo. 1917)); State v. St. Peter, 315 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1974).
51 See, e.g., Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1983)
(examining Branzburg only in the context of public records requests).
58 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (West 1999) (specifically defining who qualifies
as a "professional journalist" and what constitutes "news" and "waiver").
59 See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005) (protecting only those three
entities).
60 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4) (1999) (covering "journalist[s], scholar[s],
educator[s], polemicist[s], or other[s]").
61 See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5942(a) (West 2000) (applying the privilege in all
proceedings). But see NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2006) (specifically
enumerating proceedings).
62 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995) (requiring materiality, exhaustion of
alternatives, and necessity).
63 See, e.g., Frey v. Multimedia, Inc., 42 F.3d 1388 (6th Cir. 1994); Riley v. City of
Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979).
64 FED. R. EvID. 501 (deeming that privileges shall be construed under common law or
state law).
65 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient
privilege because of near unanimity in state law).
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II. HOLDERS OF A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Having provided the necessary legal context for a discussion of the
reporter's privilege, this Note's focus now turns to the applicability of
the privilege.66 The Supreme Court's refusal in Branzburg to
recognize a reporter's privilege, and its refusal to revisit the question
in the nearly thirty-five years since that decision, has left lower
federal courts split over the scope and applicability of the reporter's
privilege. The primary question of this section is to whom a reporter's
privilege applies. This requires defining both "journalist" and
"journalism." One definition involves a functional approach, defining
journalism as "a fact-based search for truth, collaborative in nature
and subject to review, and whose ultimate beneficiary is the audience
for, not the sponsor of the information., 67 Yet, beginning even from
this premise makes defining a journalist for purposes of a reporter's
privilege a difficult task for both courts and legislatures.
A. Mainstream Media
Assuming that a federal reporter's privilege exists, Justice
Powell's concurrence in Branzburg and its subsequent interpretations
in lower federal courts leave little doubt that the privilege would
apply to traditional media entities. Newspaper reporters, magazine
writers, radio broadcasters, and television correspondents could all
invoke the privilege without question. All state shield laws reinforce
this position, expressly covering print reporters and broadcasters.68
The central issue confronting traditional media entities concerns the
context in which mainstream journalists may exercise the privilege.
While Branzburg and subsequent decisions provide a semblance of
guidance from the Supreme Court on the applicability of a reporter's
privilege as it applies to traditional journalists confronted with grand
jury subpoenas, the issue becomes less clear when mainstream media
face compelled disclosure of sources in the trial phase of civil and
criminal actions. Liberal civil discovery rules allow litigants to
"obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense., 69 Civil litigants may compel
disclosure of information through a variety of means. They may
66 Clearly the question of whether a federal reporter's privilege exists is unresolved. The
remainder of this Note assumes, arguendo, that the privilege does exist insofar as it has
developed in the lower federal courts.
67 See Jessica Femec & Bridget Whelan, ho is a Journalist?, THE OHIO JOURNALIST,
Winter 2007, at 4, 5.
68 See supra Part I.B.
69 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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employ any of the recognized discovery tools, such as depositions,
interrogatories, and requests for production of documents. 70 However,
these discovery tools are generally reserved for requesting disclosure
from other parties to the suit. Litigants obtain discovery or trial
attendance from nonparties (such as journalist-witnesses) using a civil
subpoena.7'
Courts, however, have been generally skeptical of allowing civil
litigants to subpoena mainstream journalists to ask them to disclose
confidential newsgathering information at trial. While the Supreme
Court has never granted review to a case involving journalists
invoking the reporter's privilege in the civil context, those federal
appellate courts recognizing a privilege continue to look to Justice
Powell's concurrence in Branzburg. In Zerilli v. Smith,72 for example,
the plaintiffs subpoenaed a Detroit News reporter in a civil action
against the government for violating the Privacy Act.7 3 In quashing
the subpoena, the court noted that a different set of interests
controlled in civil actions, as opposed to grand jury proceedings,
because the public interest in investigating and prosecuting crimes
evaporates in the context of civil trials.74 The Zerilli court held First
Amendment protections to be paramount to the trial interests of civil
litigants: "When striking the balance between the civil litigant's
interest in compelled disclosure and the public interest in protecting a
newspaper's confidential sources, we will be mindful of the preferred
position of the First Amendment and the importance of a vigorous
",75press. Under this approach, the reporter's privilege creates a
presumption against requiring disclosure of a journalist's sources.
However, mindful of Justice Powell, courts have allowed civil
litigants to overcome that presumption by demonstrating that their
interests outweigh the public interest in preserving a free press and
First Amendment protections. If a party can show that the privileged
information is: (1) critical to the heart of a claim or defense, (2)
highly material and relevant, and (3) not obtainable from other
sources, then the reporter's privilege is overcome, and courts require
disclosure.7 6 Other courts have reached different results under similar
circumstances.77
70 See generally id. at 26-37 (setting forth rules governing disclosures and discovery).
71 Id. at45.
72 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 711-12 (relying heavily on Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(distinguishing the grand jury context of Branzburg)).
75 Id. at 712.
76 Id. at 713-14. Several other circuits have adopted a similar balancing analysis in the
context of civil litigation. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979);
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Although Branzburg limits the applicability of the reporter's
privilege in criminal grand jury proceedings, lower courts differ on its
availability in a criminal trial. In his concurrence in Branzburg,
Justice Powell suggested that invoking the reporter's privilege must
"strik[e] [a] proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct., 78 Although the Branzburg Court refused to allow a
journalist to invoke the reporter's privilege in a grand jury
proceeding, other lower courts, adopting Justice Powell's approach,
have protected traditional journalists from compelled disclosure of
confidential sources in a criminal trial, albeit with different outcomes.
In In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation,79 the publisher of a
newsletter was held in contempt after refusing to divulge the source
of confidential information when subpoenaed to testify in a federal
criminal antitrust trial. The Second Circuit reversed the contempt
citation, noting that the reporter's privilege was an important tool "to
protect the important interests of reporters and the public in
preserving the confidentiality of journalists' sources., 80 However, the
court went on to hold that the government or a criminal defendant
could overcome the reporter's privilege at trial by satisfying the same
balancing test used in civil litigation, described above. "[D]isclosure
may be ordered only upon a clear and specific showing that the
information is: highly material and relevant, necessary or critical to
the maintenance of the claim, and not obtainable from other available
sources." 81 Other cases have applied this test in rejecting claims of
privilege. These decisions evidence the vitality of Justice Powell's
concurrence in Branzburg and the erosion of the Branzburg
majority's steadfast rejection of the reporter's privilege as it applies to
traditional journalists.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1978); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464
F.2d 986 (8th Cir. 1972); U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw-Hill Co., 507
F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2007); SEC v. Seahawk Deep Ocean Tech., Inc., 166 F.R.D. 268 (D.
Conn. 1996). But see Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980)
(extending Branzburg to hold the privilege inapplicable in civil litigation).
77 See Pete Yost, Anthrax Reporter Held in Contempt, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 8,
2008 (describing how a federal judge held reporter Toni Locy in contempt for his refusal to
disclose confidential news information in a civil lawsuit related to the publication of news
stories about the anthrax attacks in 2001).
78 408 U.S. 665, 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
79 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982).
80 Id. at 7.
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983).
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An interesting question involving traditional media is also raised in
the context of legislative inquiries.83 Congress, in holding legislative
hearings on pertinent issues, often compels witnesses to appear and
give testimony. The congressional power to issue subpoenas is
statutory but has also been recognized by the Supreme Court as an
extension of the Necessary and Proper Clause of the federal
Constitution.84 Federal law provides Congress with the power to hold
witnesses in contempt, making it a crime to "refuse[ ] to answer any
question pertinent to the question under [congressional] inquiry. 85
Moreover, a federal statute limits the applicability of evidentiary
privileges in the legislative setting, declaring that "[n]o witness is
privileged to refuse to testify ... upon the ground that his testimony
... may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous." 86
However, witnesses appearing before Congress often assert
privileges to shield their testimony. In Watkins v. United States,87 a
witness appearing before the House Un-American Activities
Committee refused to testify. In overturning the congressional
contempt citation, the Supreme Court noted that "the constitutional
rights of witnesses will be respected by the Congress as they are in a
court of justice. The Bill of Rights is applicable to investigations as to
all forms of governmental action . . . . [T]he First Amendment
freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief and association
[cannot] be abridged., 88 Although Watkins specifically references the
First Amendment, it does not involve an assertion of a reporter's
privilege in the legislative context. Indeed, there is no judicial
precedent involving an assertion of the reporter's privilege during
legislative inquiries. However, in 1992, National Public Radio
83 For specific discussion of the reporter's privilege in the context of legislative
investigations, see James J. Mangan, Contempt for the Fourth Estate: No Reporter's Privilege
Before a Congressional Investigation, 83 GEO. L.J. 129 (1994) (arguing that a reporter's
privilege in this context cannot be supported under existing judicial precedent and would unduly
hinder congressional powers of inquiry and oversight). The issue also arises in the scope of
administrative inquiries. See U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw-Hill Co.,
507 F. Supp. 2d 45 (D.D.C. 2007).
8 2 U.S.C. § 190(m) (2006) (allowing Congress to issue subpoenas); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The Supreme Court has historically given great deference to
the power of congressional inquiry. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957)
(noting that "[t]he power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative
process [and such] power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes").
85 2 U.S.C. § 192 (2000) (providing for a maximum penalty of a one-thousand-dollar fine
and twelve months of imprisonment).
86 2 U.S.C. § 193 (2001).
87 354 U.S. 178.
88 Id. at 188. Recently, President George W. Bush vowed to fight congressional subpoenas
on the grounds of executive privilege. Laurie Kellman, House Panel OKs Subpoenas for Bush
Aides, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 21, 2007.
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correspondent Nina Totenberg, after being subpoenaed, refused to
disclose confidential newsgathering information concerning the
nomination of Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court.
Although the independent special counsel conducting the inquiry
sought to have Totenberg held in contempt, the Senate Rules
Committee chairman refused, noting that a contempt citation "could
have a chilling effect on the media [and] could close a door where
more doors need opening." 89 Although some commentators believe a
reporter's privilege would not survive judicial scrutiny in the context
of legislative inquiries, the question has not yet reached the federal
judiciary.90 By rethinking Branzburg and applying Justice Powell's
qualified privilege, as many federal appellate courts have, it may be
possible to ensure the confidentiality of a journalist's sources, even
before a congressional committee.
B. Nontraditional Media
The question of applicability becomes significantly more clouded
when considering nontraditional media sources. The advent and
expansion of the Internet complicates the analysis of who qualifies as
a journalist for purposes of invoking a reporter's privilege. For
instance, many traditional media entities have corresponding or
subsidiary Internet publications. 91 Much of the "new media"
circulation occurs exclusively via the Internet. The analysis becomes
even more difficult in the context of independent persons. Whether
independent print publishers or Internet bloggers could invoke a
reporter's privilege is a novel question for many courts. This section
addresses the question of extending the reporter's privilege to such
nontraditional media.
The question of whether a reporter's privilege extends to
independent print publications is resolved in a relatively
straightforward manner that closely mirrors the analysis applicable to
traditional media. Independent print and Internet publications are
analogous to traditional print media in both form and circulation. In
most instances, a court interprets a state's shield law in determining
whether the privilege applies to nontraditional entities. For example,
in Forensic Advisors, Inc. v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.,92 a Maryland
89 Misguided Business; Senate Committee Decides to Quit Abusing Reporters, HOUSTON
CHRON., Mar. 28, 1992, at B10.
90 See Mangan, supra note 83.
91 See, e.g., TIME MAGAZINE, http://www.time.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009); N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009); Cable News Network,
http://www.cnn.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009).
92 907 A.2d 855 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006).
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appellate court held that the statutory reporter's privilege reaches
independent publications. Forensic Advisors, Inc. publishes The
EyeShade Report, which provides subscribers with periodic
information about publicly traded companies. It is circulated
primarily via the Internet. In a civil defamation action, Matrixx
Initiatives, Inc. sought to depose Forensic president Timothy
Mulligan regarding the source of allegedly defamatory statements
published in The EyeShade Report. Forensic moved to quash the
subpoena of Mulligan, asserting a reporter's privilege. The trial court
ordered Forensic to comply with the subpoena, noting that whether
The EyeShade Report fell within the scope of the Maryland shield law
"can be dealt with on a question-by-question basis. If [the disclosed
information is] not admissible or if it ought to be protected, certainly
the [court and applicable discovery rules] can ... provide [Forensic
with] protection., 93 The Maryland appellate court adopted the trial
court's ruling and conditionally affirmed continued discovery
proceedings with respect to the subpoena.94
Other courts have declined to recognize the protections of a
reporter's privilege for similar publications. A federal court in a
diversity case refused to apply the privilege to a similar financial
newsletter, published and distributed via the internet bimonthly. 95 The
court noted that the narrow language of the Ohio shield law
"indirectly indicates a specific intent of the legislature" to restrict
application of the privilege only to traditional newsgathering
entities. 96 Conversely, the federal district court in Washington, D.C.
recognized the privilege as applying to the publisher of an energy
newsletter, who was subpoenaed in connection with an investigation
of price manipulation, but held the privilege inapplicable under the
circumstances of the case because the publisher did not satisfy the
court's balancing test requirements.97
Courts have also declined to extend the privilege to independent
authors. 98 The most telling instance involving a freelance writer
remains the contempt proceedings of Texas author Vanessa Leggett.
Leggett was jailed after she refused to turn over to a federal grand
jury the volumes of interview materials she had compiled while
93 Id. at 860.
94 Id. at 863.
95 Deltec, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 788 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
96 Id. at 789 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (West 2006)).
97 U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. McGraw-Hill Co., 507 F. Supp. 2d 45
(D.D.C. 2007).
98 Discussion of the scholar's privilege, while closely related to the reporter's privilege, is
omitted. The scholar's privilege has its own body of law and its own unique history, which fall
outside the scope of this discussion.
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working on a true-crime book about the murder of Houston socialite
Doris Angleton. The book allegedly contained an interview with
Angleton's brother-in-law Roger Angleton, who was charged with her
murder but committed suicide while in jail awaiting trial. 99 Although
Leggett's imprisonment was widely publicized and criticized,'00 the
Fifth Circuit upheld Leggett's contempt charges in an unpublished
opinion. 101 The U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant review of
Leggett's privilege claim. 10 2 Leggett spent 168 days in jail and was
freed only after the grand jury's term expired. 103 Leggett's case is not
unique, as the government continues to subpoena independent authors
reporting on government affairs.1
0 4
The newer the medium in question, however, the less guidance
courts provide. In recent years, the popularity of bloggers has
skyrocketed. 105 Blogging allows individuals to post material virtually
in real time to the Internet, for the consumption and discussion of
others. Although much published material poses a fundamental
journalistic question-namely, whether it is news-blog material
intensifies that inquiry. 10 6 Blogs often combine news or current events
and commentary; their diversity also affects this issue. Blogs may
range from personal diaries to extensive commentary on political,
economic and social happenings. These "professional" blogs often
receive coverage in the traditional press, particularly because of their
ability to cover stories more quickly and disseminate information at a
higher rate than the mainstream media. However, whether bloggers
should be classified as journalists for the purpose of invoking a
reporter's privilege is a novel question.
99 See Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Author Lands in Jail for Refusing to
Turn Over Notes, http://www.rcfp.org/news/2001/0725inregr.html (last visited May 13, 2008).100 See, e.g., Daniel Scardino, Vanessa Leggett Serves Maximum Jail Time, First
Amendment-Based Reporter's Privilege Under Siege, 19 COMM. L. 1 (2002) (criticizing both the
Department of Justice and the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for their handling of
the Leggett case).
10 1 In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Vanessa Leggett, No 01-20745 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).
102 Leggett v. United States, 535 U.S. 1011 (2002).
1
0 3 See supra note 17.
104 See Eggen, supra note 19.
105 According to Pew Research Institute surveys in 2005 and 2006, more than twelve
million American adults kept blogs, which more than fifty-seven million American adults read.
AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH Fox, BLOGGERS: A PORTRAIT OF THE INTERNET'S NEW
STORYTELLERS 22 (Pew Internet & American Life Project 2006).
10 Interestingly, only thirty-four percent of bloggers surveyed self-identified as journalists.
Id. at 11. Whether this would ever persuade a court to limit a reporter's privilege so as to
exclude bloggers is unclear. If so, it does raise the question of how many of the bloggers not
considering themselves journalists would change positions and attempt to invoke the protections
of a reporter's privilege when faced with a subpoena.
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Courts have been reluctant to recognize bloggers as journalists.
For example, in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Doe 1,107 a California court
expressly refused to decide the question of whether a blogger is a
journalist. The plaintiffs filed suit for misappropriation and disclosure
of trade secrets against unidentified parties after the trade secrets
appeared in an Internet blog that three individuals maintained. Apple
filed a motion to compel the bloggers to disclose the source of the
misappropriated information. The court applied California's five-part
balancing test and analyzed the state's shield law.108 "Based on [the
language of the shield law] and the facts presented, it is far from clear
that [the bloggers] qualifqy] for relief from the subpoena."' 1 9 In
reaching its holding, the court primarily noted that the balance of
interests favored disclosure regardless of the bloggers' status." 0
In Wolf v. United States,"' the Ninth Circuit ordered blogger
Joshua Wolf to be returned to prison for civil contempt. Wolf filmed a
violent protest and intended to publish the footage via his blog. A
federal grand jury impaneled to hand down criminal charges in
connection with the violence ordered Wolf to produce his videotape.
When Wolf refused, citing a reporter's privilege, he was held in
contempt and imprisoned. In upholding the contempt order, the Ninth
Circuit relied heavily on Branzburg and squarely rejected a federal
reporter's privilege."12 Although the appellate panel did not expressly
consider Wolf's status as a reporter, the court's application of a
privilege exclusively to traditional media implies that bloggers would
not receive similar protection. The court held that, because Wolf s
videotape records criminal activity, the government, whose interest in
prosecuting federal crimes is compelling, is entitled to the evidence.
The Ninth Circuit could have arguably reached an opposite result in a
similar case involving the subpoena of traditional journalists, given
the more public forum in which traditional reporters operate.
Certainly, in a state prosecution, the mainstream media would have
received protections to which Wolf is not entitled, given California's
statutory privilege." 3 Such disparities are based only on the label
1072005 WL 578641 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2005).
108 d at *6 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1070(a), (b) (West 1995)).
1091d. at *7.
n Id.
11201 F. App'x 430 (9th Cir. 2006).
112 Id. at 432-33.
113 California's evidence rules provide, in pertinent part, that "[no] radio or television news
reporter [can] be adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose ... any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to
the public." CAL. EVID. CODE. § 1070(b) (West 1995). Thus, the California shield law creates an
absolute reporter's privilege for radio or television news reporters. Had a radio or television
station employed Wolf, the state could never compel him to disclose his work-product or hold
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given news-gatherers; such inapposite results only bolster the
necessity to treat independent journalists equally. Wolf was freed
after serving a record 226 days in federal prison.' 14
C. Expanding the Privilege to Non-Media Entities
Nearly all courts and commentators agree that any reporter's
privilege cannot be absolute."i 5 Instead, courts and legislatures
routinely balance the First Amendment interests of the privilege-
holder with the general judicial and societal interests of those seeking
disclosure of privileged information. Yet if a reporter's privilege may
arguably expand to encompass nontraditional media entities, how do
courts and legislatures strike the proper balance? Put simply, can a
non-media entity invoke a reporter's privilege? A few courts have
addressed the question of non-media entities and their ability to
invoke the privilege. This section examines these unique situations.
Already reluctant to apply a reporter's privilege to nontraditional
media, courts are even more skeptical about extending the privilege to
non-media entities. The Minnesota Supreme Court recently evaluated
the reporter's privilege in the context of political campaigns, holding
that a judicial candidate could not invoke the privilege."l 6 A judicial
challenger had made public statements disparaging the record of the
incumbent judge he was opposing. Minnesota ethics rules prohibit
knowingly or recklessly making false statements about the
qualifications or integrity of a judge or candidate for judicial office."17
Investigators subpoenaed the challenger, asking him to disclose the
source of his information so that they could determine whether the
statements were actually false. The challenger refused, citing a
reporter's privilege to withhold the identity of confidential sources.
As in many other novel cases, the majority opinion declined to decide
whether a reporter's privilege was applicable. Instead, it assumed
that, even if a privilege applied, the public interest overcame any
him in contempt for refusing such disclosure.
14 See Mozingo, supra note 18.
15 See infra Parts I.A., I.B., II.A., II.B. (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)
(Powell, J., concurring) and its progeny); see also Rex S. Heinke & Galit Avitan, Reconciling
Branzburg and Daily Mail: A Proposal for a Qualified Reporters' Privilege, 32 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 503 (2006); Rodney A. Smolla, Qualified Intimacy, Celebrity, and the Case for a
Newsgathering Privilege, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1233, 1249-50 (2000); Glenn A. Browne, Note,
Just Between You and Me ... For Now: Reexamining a Qualified Privilege for Reporters to
Keep Sources Confidential in Grand Jury Proceedings, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 739 (1988).
16 In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct, 720 N.W.2d 807 (Minn. 2006).
117 MINN. RULE OF PROF'L COND. 8.2(a) (West 2006).
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individual First Amendment interests. 1 8 Separate concurrences and
dissents both found that a reporter's privilege would apply, but,
subject to appropriate balancing tests, the privilege would (or would
not) be overcome.1 19
Courts have also addressed whether various associations could
invoke a reporter's privilege. In T.S. v. Boy Scouts of America,120 a
former boy scout filed suit against the organization, alleging sexual
molestation by scoutmasters. The plaintiff, seeking records of
complaints against the scoutmasters, sought disclosure of BSA
files. 12 1 Although the BSA did not directly assert a reporter's
privilege, it drew heavily on that recognized state privilege to create
an analogous privilege for confidential information possessed by
organizations.122 The court reaffirmed the ability of civil litigants to
assert the state's qualified reporter's privilege and agreed with the
BSA that an analogous privilege was applicable to associations.123
The court, however, imposed a balancing test, noting the privilege
could be overcome if "the claim was meritorious, . . . [if] the
information being sought went to the heart of [the claim, and if]... a
reasonable effort [had been] made to acquire the desired information
by other means." 124 The appellate court found that the trial court had
implicitly made these findings in resolving discovery disputes and
affirmed disclosure. 125
Conversely, other courts have flatly refused to extend a reporter's
privilege to voluntary associations. In United States Department of
Education v. National Collegiate Athletic Association,126 the court
compelled disclosure of confidential NCAA records for which the
Department of Education had issued an administrative subpoena in
order to investigate various violations of university administrative
policies. The court expressed reluctance to recognize new or
expanded privileges, noting that "[t]he Supreme Court's admonition
against new privileges has prevailed [even] where the argument for
confidentiality was compelling."' 127 Similarly, an attorney was not
18Id. at 817.
119d at 818-19 (P. Anderson, J., concurring) (applying the privilege but balancing
compelled disclosure); id. at 819-20 (G. Anderson, J., dissenting) (applying the privilege and
stating that it was not overcome).
120138 P.3d 1053 (Wash. 2006) (en banc).
21 d. at 1054-56.
122 Id.
23d. at 1058-59.
124 Id. at 1058 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (third brackets in original).
125d. at 1060-61.
126 2006 WL 3198822 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 8, 2006), aff'd, 483 F.3d 936 (7th Cir 2007).
127 d. at *5 (citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)).
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entitled to assert a reporter's privilege in refusing to identify his
client.1
28
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRIVILEGE
Whether a reporter's privilege does or should exist in the federal
courts is a matter of continuing discussion. That, however, is not the
focus here. Should the U.S. Supreme Court overrule Branzburg or
adopt Justice Powell's concurrence, or should Congress enact a
federal shield law, the consequences of that policy decision would
mark a momentous shift in First Amendment law. Its impact would
not only raise new questions of the privilege's applicability, but
would also reach issues such as licensing and the impact on state laws
and national security. This section discusses some of these
consequences, namely the concerns about the scope of a federal
reporter's privilege and the dangers of government licensure of
journalists.1 29
A. Applicability of the Privilege
Most of the judicial guidance on applying a reporter's privilege to
nontraditional media strikes against the privilege. The few courts to
provide such protection have done so while interpreting the most
liberal of state shield laws. Indeed, the more expansive the language
of the shield law, the more likely a court will apply the privilege to
nontraditional media entities. However, even in cases where a
reporter's privilege does apply, the courts often compel disclosure,
using the balancing of interests as judicial cover. These courts'
emphasis on this type of reasoning is misplaced. The underlying
social and constitutional policies of a reporter's privilege are to
protect a fundamental social institution from government abuse. The
general applicability of a reporter's privilege must be a question of
process rather than form. No one would question the applicability of a
128 See Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., No. 05-1203-WEB, 2006 WL 2037395, *2-3
(D. Kan. July 18, 2006). The attorney in this case had originally asserted the attorney-client
privilege. When the court rejected his claim, he turned to the reporter's privilege. Id.
129 The practical effect of defining a journalist has a continuing impact on numerous areas
of state law. See, e.g., John Caniglia, Gun-Permit Case Raises Issues: Who Is a Journalist?,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Mar. 20, 2007, at B4. For a discussion of a reporter's privilege in
the context of national security, see Jonathan H. Adler, Prosecuting Journalists Would Be
Unprecedented and Unwise, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 10 (2006); Bryan Cunningham,
Inconvenient Truths About Leaks, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 13 (2006); John C. Eastman,
Freedom of the Press Is Not Freedom from the Law, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 8 (2006);
Kate Martin, Leaks, National Security and the First Amendment, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP.
6 (2006); Gabriel Schoenfeld, What To Do About Leaks?, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 1
(2006); Geoffrey R. Stone, The Lessons of History, 28 A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REP. 1 (2006).
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reporter's privilege to a newspaper reporter or television
correspondent. However, the reportorial status of an independent
internet blogger is questioned. These independent entities, albeit
nontraditional, often serve the same newsgathering functions as
traditional media. They have become such a force in American
journalism that mainstream media often incorporate the independent
analysis in their own reporting. Yet, an independent claim to the
privilege continues to be routinely questioned or rejected outright.
Courts understandably express reluctance to expand a reporter's
privilege and further limit the truth-finding functions of the judicial
process. However, where prudence and logic, here by virtue of the
newsgathering functions of nontraditional media, dictate expansion,
courts should not shy away from applying already applicable law,
irrespective of novelty.
130
The divergent analyses of courts in applying a reporter's privilege
to non-media entities illustrate the complexity inherent in novel
questions of law. First, scarcity of applicable precedent provides little
guidance for courts. However, sound legal reasoning should be
sufficient to guide courts in properly applying the privilege. Actions
from sister jurisdictions should provide enough preliminary guidance
for a court's reasoning. More importantly, the court should not shy
away from a serious evaluation of the underlying policy
considerations of the privilege. The reporter's privilege, at its heart,
provides an instrumental justification of sorts-essentially, a means to
the end of adequately maintaining recognized First Amendment
freedoms. Courts must consider one fundamental question to
adequately perform this analysis: are the parties invoking the
privilege involved in the gathering and public dissemination of
information? If the factual situation with which a court is confronted
falls within this policy, the court should cast aside its reluctance to
expand a privilege and apply established law to the instant facts.
However, because a reporter's privilege cannot be absolute, courts
should employ traditional balancing tests to ensure a fair and just
result is reached. This is particularly true when confronting the unique
130It is well established that federal courts are under no obligation to discuss or decide
matters unnecessary to the final determination of the case or controversy. See, e.g., McLanahan
v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. 170 (1828). It is equally clear that federal courts violate the case
or controversy requirement of their limited Article III jurisdiction by issuing advisory opinions
or deciding hypothetical questions. See, e.g., Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792);
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Consequently, the reader should not infer that federal
courts are urged to unnecessarily contort the reporters' privilege, hypothesize about future
application, or otherwise employ it when circumstances do not warrant its application. Instead,
federal courts must simply remain open-minded and be willing to applying the privilege in new,
yet appropriate circumstances, as they arise.
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situation of applying a limited reporter's privilege to non-media
entities.
B. Licensing of Journalists
Creating a federal reporter's privilege, especially by enacting a
federal shield law, however, would create the danger of undue
regulation of the media. Assuming the existence of a federal
reporter's privilege, whether statutory or judicially created, as the
above discussion illustrates, deciding who is a journalist (and, as
such, could invoke the privilege) is a question that ultimately remains
largely unanswered. It is likely, given the historic practice in the
states and general public acceptance, that traditional media would be
entitled to the protections of a reporter's privilege. A cogent argument
may be advanced in favor of extending such protections to
independent journalists and nontraditional media as well. It is at this
margin where the question becomes most difficult, particularly where
non-media entities are involved. At some point, however, a policy
decision is required in order to define the limits of the reporter's
privilege. Justice White deferred engaging in such analysis whose
time had not yet come:
We are unwilling to embark the judiciary on a long and
difficult journey to such an uncertain destination. The
administration of a constitutional newsman's privilege would
present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.
Sooner or later, it would be necessary to define those
categories of newsmen who qualified for the privilege .... 13'
Yet the question remains squarely at the forefront of First
Amendment jurisprudence. It is the inability or unwillingness of
courts to fashion a satisfactory answer to this question in which one
of the great dangers of a reporter's privilege arises. When the
legislature enacts a privilege, the legislature inherently also regulates
the privilege's holders. Should Congress pass a federal shield law,
'3' Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703--04 (1972). Justice White went on to note that
"every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information" could potentially qualify for
the privilege. Id. at 704 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)). This he was
unwilling to do, leaving it to Congress to assess the necessity of enacting a statutory shield law
to protect journalists. Id. at 706; see also Randall D. Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth
Estate Inmates: The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter's Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 385, 428-37 (2006) (arguing that creating a privilege presents too many difficult policy
choices for courts and, as such, should be left to the legislature); Geoffrey R. Stone, Half a
Shield Is Better than None, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2007, at A21 (calling on Congress to develop a
federal shield law, even if it means compromising expanded protection).
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whether because of judicial refusal or as a legislative response,
enacting a federal reporter's privilege opens a Pandora's box to
increased federal media regulation, including licensure of journalists.
Upon careful examination, federal regulation of journalists through
licensing provisions is not as remote a possibility as Orwellian fiction
might suggest. Despite the admonition of the First Amendment, the
media business is a heavily regulated industry, and courts have often
grappled with the limitations on press freedoms. 132 Despite the
judiciary's perpetual concerns for the First Amendment, media
regulation is commonplace. In 1934, Congress created the Federal
Communications Commission "[f]or the purpose of regulating
interstate and foreign commerce in communication" and charged the
FCC with administering and enforcing broadcast media regulations.
1 33
These requirements concern not only the format of communications,
but also the substance of communications, with an increasingly close
eye to content.1 34 Moreover, the expansive authority of the FCC
evidences the very real existence of federal licensing requirements.
Federal regulations already require licenses for the operation of
amateur and commercial radio stations, television studios, cable
outfits, and satellite broadcasters. 135 As a result, radio and television
broadcast journalists fall within the reach of FCC licensure. FCC
regulations governing radio and television content cover myriad
issues, including the truthfulness, objectivity, equality, and decency
of broadcasts, including news.136 The agency also regulates the
character of license applicants. 1
37
Given the prolixity of federal broadcast rules, it is clear that
continued congressional intervention in the media industry would
breed further regulation. It is very likely that enacting a federal
132 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (striking
down licensing requirements for newspaper stands but leaving room for content- or media-
neutral regulations).
13347 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
134 For example, the Communications Decency Act provides for criminal sanctions against
"who[m]ever [broadcasts] any obscene, indecent, or profane language." 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(2000). The FCC also provides for decency regulations, prohibiting "licensee[s] of a radio or
television broadcast station [from broadcasting] any material which is obscene." 47 C.F.R. §
73.3999 (2007).
13547 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000) (providing the FCC with regulatory and enforcement
powers). Individual regulations concerning specific media are contained throughout Title 47 of
the Code of Federal Regulations.
136 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1217 (2007) (prohibiting the broadcast of hoaxes); 47 C.F.R. §
73.1910 (requiring broadcasters "to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views"); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4050 (requiring a weekly quota of children's programming);
47 C.F.R. § 73.4185 (regulating political broadcasts).




statutory reporter's privilege would lead to the licensing of individual
journalists. However, states with similar shield laws have not
experienced this phenomenon. While no state shield law includes
specific licensing provisions, many do narrowly circumscribe the
limits of the privilege, extending protection only to traditional
journalists or in particular circumstances. 138 Given the potential
preemptive force of federal regulations and the interstate nature of the
media business, state legislatures are without authority to impose the
type of sweeping regulations that the federal government is able to
promulgate. Finally, because the federal district and appellate courts
have had little occasion to construe state shield laws,139 the federal
judiciary would be left to develop its own body of precedent
concerning the specifics of a federal shield law.
Finally, licensing as it relates to other federal evidentiary
privileges is not a foreign concept. The Federal Rules of Evidence do
not expressly recognize any privileges; however, the federal courts
have enumerated several vocational privileges over time. 140 Each of
these professional privileges, irrespective of whether recognized by
the federal courts or created by state statute, requires the trustee of the
privilege to be a licensed practitioner in his or her respective field.
41
Given this licensing requirement for other recognized vocational
privileges, it would not be extraordinary for a reporter's privilege to
require licensure of journalists. And so Justice White's remark in
Branzburg that eventually journalists would be categorized becomes a
prophetic insight. 42 Regulation of journalists by virtue of a federal
shield law no longer raises the specter of licensing-that possibility
becomes a distinct reality.
138 See supra Part I.C.
139 While federal courts sitting in diversity apply substantive state law, they nevertheless
apply federal procedural and evidentiary law, instead of the evidentiary rules of states. See FED.
R. EVID. 501 (stating that federal privilege rules always control in federal criminal actions);
Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 66 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that federal privilege rules control in
federal civil actions, except where the privilege is an essential element of a supplemental state
claim).
140 See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient
privilege); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (recognizing an attorney-client
privilege); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (recognizing an attorney-client
privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing a
clergyman-penitent privilege); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.23 (West 2004) (creating
an accountant's privilege for certified public accountants); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4504 (McKinney
2007) (creating a broad doctor-patient privilege involving licensed healthcare professionals).
141 For example, Jaffee requires that the psychotherapist be licensed, Fisher requires that
the attorney be licensed, and In re Grand Jury Investigation requires that the clergyman be
ordained. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. 1; Fisher, 425 U.S. 391; In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d
374 (1990).
142408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972).
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Some commentators believe that licensure of journalists is an
appropriate means of ensuring effective administration of a federal
reporter's privilege. 143  However, numerous inherent dangers
accompany the government licensure of journalists. The most
prominent of these pitfalls is the risk of limited protection for
journalists. As the above discussion demonstrates, the difficulties in
defining who exactly qualifies as a journalist makes the question not a
simple one to answer. As a result, statutory privileges often trade
licensing requirements for limited protection. This is illustrated in
numerous states whose legislatures have enacted statutory privileges.
Many state shield laws grant the protections of the reporter's privilege
only to traditional media outlets, 144 the alternative being a privilege
the limits of which are defined by a functional journalistic approach.
The functional approach extends protection to anyone engaged in the
gathering and public dissemination of news. However, the possibility
of government licensure attaches to this broader protection.145 Thus,
in hopes of avoiding unwanted-and, possibly, unconstitutional,
under the First Amendment-licensing requirements, a federal shield
law could unduly limit the very protections a reporter's privilege
means to provide.
Licensing requirements could also impose hefty financial burdens
on journalists seeking to invoke the privilege. Government-issued
licenses necessarily carry licensing fees, including issuance, renewal,
taxes, and other special assessments.146 The FCC already imposes
143See, e.g., Barry P. MacDonald, The First Amendment and the Free Flow of
Information: Towards a Realistic Right to Gather Information Age, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 249 (2004)
(supporting a requirement that any claimant to a reporter's privilege demonstrate membership in
journalistic associations, formal training, or other credentials). Although advocates of licensing
rightly point out that such requirements would lead to higher journalistic standards, it is also
worthy to note that journalism, while not a licensed profession per se, is already a
self-regulating industry. Professional associations and generally accepted ethical codes govern
the conduct of journalists. See Society of Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics,
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited May 13, 2008). Moreover, in an industry in
which credibility is the primary currency, licensing requirements would do little to prevent
unethical or otherwise inappropriate journalistic practices. Instead, the marketplace would
self-correct journalistic misconduct, ferreting out the degenerate news-gatherers as confidential
sources refuse to do business with them.
144 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (LexisNexis 2005) (limiting the privilege to
newspaper, radio, and television reporters); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995) (limiting the
privilege to newspaper, radio, and television reporters, as well as book and magazine writers).
145 A few states, however, have enjoyed success with shield laws providing broad coverage
without requiring licensing of journalists. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90-5015 (2006) (extending the
privilege to those regularly engaged in publishing "information of public concern relating to
local, statewide, national, or worldwide issues"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-:1454 (1999)
(same); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (2007) (same).
146 One can hardly obtain a state driver's license without paying for the issuance or renewal




substantial licensing requirements for obtaining broadcast licenses. 147
For new commercial radio or television stations, such fees can range
upwards of five thousand dollars. 148 While established, commercial
(or mainstream) broadcasters can afford to bear the costs of these
licenses, independent journalists are unlikely to be in a similar
financial position. And while independent journalists are utilizing
new (and relatively affordable) technology, such as the Internet, to
expand their media presence, should the government institute
licensing requirements, these media could eventually suffer the same
fate as conventional broadcasters. Imposing high financial burdens on
journalists also creates an implicit, often overlooked, danger-the
homogenization of media. Levying substantial licensing fees
inherently stratifies journalists into two classes: those who can afford
to pay, and those who cannot. Eventually, market forces allow only
the former class to continue practicing journalism, while the latter
class must fold under the financial pressures. Media homogenization
is already evident in all traditional media.149 As individual media
voices submit to financial constraints, the surviving media elite
swallow the market share that this vacuum creates. 50
Licensing journalists may also bring with it a host of ancillary
requirements. For example, FCC regulations already require
broadcast licensees to meet certain standards and criteria in order for
licensees to retain their broadcast privileges. 15' Licensing journalists
creates the possibility of similar requirements. Journalists could be
required to keep formal records of conversations with sources.
Although most journalists already keep detailed notes, licensing
regulations could allow the government access to confidential
work-product (essentially circumventing the reporter's privilege).
Similarly, as is the case with other licensed professions, journalists
could be required to undergo formal continued training. While
continuing education is a worthy obligation for some professions, it
147 71 Fed. Reg. 54204-34 (Sept. 14, 2006) (listing broadcast-license application fees).
14847 C.F.R. § 1.1104 (2007) (providing fees for television stations of: $4,000 for a
television construction license, $895 for a main studio license, and $270 for a broadcast license;
and fees for commercial AM radio of: $3,565 for a radio construction license, $895 for a main
studio license, $585 for a broadcast license, and $675 for each antenna license).
149 For instance, the Tribune Company alone (whose monthly revenues for February 2007
were more than $385 million-in the media industry, a welterweight conglomerate) owns
twenty-three television stations, eleven newspapers, one national broadcasting studio, and one
radio station. Tribune Company, http://www.tribune.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
150 See Dean Colby, Toward a New Media Autonomy, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 433 (2005),
for a discussion of the effects of media homogenization.
'5' See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.1800 (2007) (requiring broadcast carriers to retain operational
logs); 47 C.F.R. § 73.4099 (mandating financial qualifications for licensees); 47 C.F.R. §
73.4280 (requiring licensees to meet and maintain certain character qualifications).
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would be superfluous in most of media practice. The work of
attorneys and healthcare professionals, for example, requires
practitioners to keep up with substantive and procedural
developments in their respective fields. By contrast, most core
journalistic practices are unchanging, firmly rooted in the traditions of
the profession. While journalists are wise to keep up with developing
trends, formal training is not required to accomplish this end.
152
Finally, journalists would not bear the burdens of licensing
requirements alone. Instituting federal regulations of journalists
would create the need for a new bureaucratic infrastructure. Federal
agencies would be responsible for administering regulations and
enforcing compliance.
Each of these dangers inherent in licensing leads to an unwelcome
chilling effect on free press. Throughout the history of First
Amendment jurisprudence, courts have condemned such impositions
on firmly established rights. The Supreme Court has described this
chilling effect as "antithetical to the First Amendment's
protection[s.]"'' 53 The Court's frequent encomia on the necessity of
adequately protecting First Amendment freedoms is more than mere
puffing, however; the Court is genuinely concerned with the
preservation of fundamental individual American liberties. In one of
the most eloquent expositions on the primacy of First Amendment
freedoms, the Supreme Court noted that "these liberties are, in the
long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the
part of the citizens of a democracy. The essential characteristic of
these liberties is, that under their shield many types of life, character,
opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. 154 The
paramount danger of government licensure of journalists is that it will
lead to censorship based on content. The Supreme Court, in striking
down regulations targeting specific media, recognized this threat,
noting that "law or policy permitting communication in a certain
manner for some but not for others raises the specter of content and
viewpoint censorship.' 55 The government, as the gatekeeper of
journalists' licenses, would also become the gatekeeper of editorial
content. Should the licensor dislike or disagree with the views that the
licensee expresses, irrespective of the truth or necessity of such
views, the government could easily refuse to grant, refuse to renew,
52 Reporters who stay current will likely meet continued success, while those who do not
will fall by the wayside as others pass them by.
'53 Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
154 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
155 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 763 (1988).
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or revoke outright a dissenting journalist's license to report. 56 This
would, in turn, essentially create a state-run media and destroy
important institutional autonomy. The press serves as essential a
function today as the Fourth Estate served in Nineteenth Century
England and pre-revolutionary France, 5 7 insofar as it provides for
crucial checks and balances on otherwise coordinate branches of
government. The chilling effect of licensing requirements would also
carry with it more concrete, practical impacts for journalists.
Concerns about compliance with licensing regulations could impede
an increasingly rapid news cycle. In a world where immediate access
to twenty-four-hour news is the norm, journalists who constantly find
themselves constrained by asking whether certain actions will cost
them their license will limit their ability to function properly.
Moreover, noncompliance with licensing requirements could lead to
criminal and civil penalties. These penalties would functionally limit
the free conduct of journalists, effectively eliminating the free flow of
information.
The crux of the issue of a reporter's privilege at the federal level
thus rests with the most appropriate means of balancing the mandates
of the First Amendment, its guarantees of free, vigorous and
unbridled press and the public interest in facilitating the free flow of
information through vibrant and diverse journalistic practices, while
ensuring the effective administration of justice. While some
commentators are freely willing to trade off First Amendment
protections, 58 and others are ready to accept a certain level of
regulation in the name of facilitating a workable compromise,'59 the
most efficacious solution still lies within the province of the judiciary.
Some may decry this approach as an inefficient use of scarce judicial
resources or as impracticable and improper, given the role of the
federal courts, but such objections cannot be well-taken. 160 A
156 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964) (noting that "would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is
believed to be true and even though it is in fact true"); see also Note, Reporters and Their
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 336
(arguing that the chilling effect would also reach a journalist's confidential sources, "[u]nless
reporters and informers can predict with some certainty the likelihood that newsmen will be
required to disclose names or information obtained in confidential relationships").
157 See THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES AND HERO WORSHIP IN HISTORY (1841) (quoting
Edmund Burke as saying "there were Three Estates in Parliament [referring to the houses of the
British legislature]; but, in the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more
important far than they all" and referring back to his own work, THOMAS CARLYLE, THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION (1837)) (emphasis added).
158 See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 143.
159 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 131.
160 The role of the courts, after all, is to resolve the cases and controversies presented to
them. Federal courts already resolve complicated matters of evidentiary privilege without great
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carefully crafted, judicially created reporter's privilege, complete with
simple, yet elucidated guidelines is best able to address the myriad
concerns presented by the question of instituting a federal reporter's
privilege.
CONCLUSION
Nearly thirty-five years after the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,161 the fate of a federal reporter's
privilege remains in a state of flux. The Supreme Court has refused to
revisit the question, while lower courts recognize varying degrees of
the privilege. One of the central questions of any inquiry regarding a
federal reporter's privilege remains to whom such a privilege would
apply. Some guidance comes from lower federal courts and the
statutory privileges enacted in many states. However, this guidance
has done little to facilitate the adoption of a privilege sufficient to
protect the First Amendment freedoms lying at its heart. Moreover, as
new proposals surface in an attempt to provide adequate protection,
new concerns become apparent. A federal shield law, for instance,
although widely supported, 162 brings with it the specter of government
licensure of journalists, the chilling effects of which would have
far-reaching implications in First Amendment jurisprudence. Some
may question the harm, especially in light of recent occurrences.
Judith Miller and Vanessa Leggett were freed from prison. But what
to do with James Risen or the next imprisoned newsgatherer? Until
the courts and Congress squarely confront one of today's most
pressing First Amendment issues, that question will remain
unanswered.
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